Pay-as-bid is the most popular auction format for selling treasury securities.
Introduction
Pay-as-bid auctions, also known as discriminatory auctions, are among the most used auction formats: each year, securities and commodities worth trillions of dollars are traded in pay-as-bid auctions. It is the most popular auction format for selling treasury securities, with 33 out of 48 countries in a recent survey using pay-as-bid auctions to sell their securities.
1 The pay-as-bid format is also used in other government operations, including the recent large-scale asset purchases in the U.S. (known as Quantitative Easing),
and it is commonly used to sell commodities such as electricity.
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Our paper provides a general theory of equilibrium bidding in pay-as-bid auctions when bidders are symmetrically informed and uncertain of the total supply up for auction. 3 We provide a tight sufficient condition for equilibrium existence that is satisfied in many environments of interest, we prove that the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is unique, and we offer a surprising bid representation theorem. We leverage our theory of equilibrium bidding to show how to optimally design supply and reserve prices in pay-as-bid auctions, and to prove that pay-as-bid auctions and uniform-price auctions (the main alternative auction format) are revenue equivalent when supply and reserve prices are designed optimally. Our revenue equivalence result might explain why the long-standing debate over which of these two auction formats is revenue superior has not been settled thus far.
Prior work, most notably Wang and Zender [2002] , Holmberg [2009] , and Ausubel et al. [2014] , proved equilibrium existence under substantially more restrictive assumptions than ours, proved the uniqueness of "nice" equilibria, and analyzed equilibria assuming linear marginal values and Pareto distribution of supply; in contrast we provide a general analysis with no parametric assumptions and we establish uniqueness in the class of all Bayesian-Nash equilibria. Our bid representation theorem is surprising in the context of the prior literature, a natural reading of which is that equilibria in pay-as-bid auctions with symmetrically informed bidders must be complex. We discuss this litera-1 See Brenner et al. [2009] . See also Bartolini and Cottarelli [1997] for an earlier survey.
2 Quantitative Easing used a reverse pay-as-bid auction. For a recent discussion of electricity markets see Maurer and Barroso [2011] . A pay-as-bid auction is implicitly run in financial markets when limit orders are followed by a market order (see e.g. Glosten [1994] ).
3 Uncertainty over supply is a feature of many securities auctions, while the symmetric information is a commonly-used simplifying assumption. With the exception of flat-demand environments, singleunit demand, and two bidder-two units examples, all known examples of equilibrium bidding restrict attention to uninformed bidders. See below for a discussion of the rich prior literature on pay-as-bid. ture below. Our work on the optimal design of supply and reserve prices has no direct counterpart in the prior literature.
Before describing our results and the rich related literature in more detail, let us discuss the environment we study, and define pay-as-bid auctions. We allow an arbitrary finite number of bidders. All bidders are symmetric and symmetrically-informed, and they do not know how large the supply of the good is; we thus allow for uncertainty over the supply, a common feature in many pay-as-bid auctions. 4 We assume that the traded good is perfectly divisible, a good approximation of treasury and commodity auctions in which tens of thousands of identical units are sold simultaneously.
The auction is run as follows. First, the bidders submit bids for each infinitesimal unit of the good. Then, the supply is realized, and the auctioneer (or, the seller) allocates the first infinitesimal unit to the bidder who submitted the highest bid, then the second unit to the bidder who submitted the second-highest bid, etc.
5 Every bidder pays their bid for each unit they obtain. The monotonic nature of how units are allocated implies that we can equivalently describe a collection of bids a bidder submitted as a reported demand curve that is weakly decreasing in quantities, but not necessarily continuous.
We study pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of this auction.
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The theory of equilibrium bidding we develop has three components. First, we establish a sufficient condition for equilibrium existence. The sufficient condition is expressed in terms of primitives of the model and it is relatively simple to check. The condition is generically tight in that the weak-inequality analogue of our sufficient condition we state is necessary for the equilibrium existence. Our condition is satisfied in the linear-Pareto settings analyzed by the prior literature. Irrespective of the distribution of supply, our 4 We analyze the case of two or more bidders; the case of one bidder is trivial. We initially assume that the distribution of supply is bounded, and we then relax this assumption. In most results we restrict attention to supply distributions with strictly positive, but possibly tiny, density between 0 and some upper bound of support. While in practice supply uncertainty is a feature of many of these auctions, we prove that its impact on the revenues is unambiguously negative. As mentioned above, the lack of private information is a simplifying assumption.
5 To fully-specify the auction we need to specify a tie-breaking rule; we adopt the standard tie-breaking rule, pro-rata on the margin, but our theory of equilibrium bidding does not hinge on this choice. This is in contrast to uniform-price auction where tie-breaking matters; see Kremer and Nyborg [2004] . 6 In equilibrium, each bidder responds to the stochastic residual supply (that is the supply given the bids of the remaining bidders). Effectively, the bidder is picking a point on each residual supply curve. In determining her best response, a bidder needs to keep in mind that: (i) the bid that is marginal if a particular residual supply curve is realized is paid not only when it is marginal, but also in any other state of nature that results in a larger allocation, and hence the bidder faces trade-offs across these different states of nature, and (ii) the bids need to be weakly monotonic in quantity, potentially a binding constraint.
condition is satisfied for linear marginal values if there is a sufficiently-large number of bidders.
Second, we prove that the pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is unique in payas-bid auctions.
7 The uniqueness of equilibrium is reassuring for the sellers using pay-asbid format; indeed, there are well-known problems posed by multiplicity of equilibria in other multi-unit auctions. 8 Uniqueness is also important for the empirical study of payas-bid auctions. Estimation strategies based on the first-order conditions, or the Euler equation, rely on agents playing comparable equilibria across auctions in the data (Février et al. [2002] , Hortaçsu and McAdams [2010] , Hortaçsu and Kastl [2012] , and Cassola et al.
[2013]). 9 Equilibrium uniqueness plays an even larger role in the study of counterfactuals (see Armantier and Sbaï [2006] ). 10 The uniqueness of equilibrium provides a theoretical foundation for these estimation strategies and counterfactual analysis.
Our third result regarding equilibrium bidding is the bid representation theorem. We show that in the unique pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium the bid for any quantity is a weighted average of the bidder's marginal values for this and larger quantities, where the weights are independent of the bidder's marginal values. The weighting distribution depends only on the distribution of supply and the number of bidders. The tail of the weighting distribution is equal to the tail of the distribution of supply scaled by the number of bidders; an increase in the number of bidders shifts the weight away from the tail and towards the unit for which the bid is submitted, hence increasing the bid for this unit.
The bid representation theorem implies several properties of equilibrium bidding: the unique equilibrium is symmetric and the bid functions are strictly decreasing and dif-7 We establish the uniqueness of bids for relevant quantities -that is, for quantities a bidder wins with positive probability. Bids for higher quantities play no role in equilibrium as long as they are not too high. Our uniqueness result and the subsequent discussion does not apply to these irrelevant bids. Also, since we work in a model with continuous quantities we do not distinguish between two bid functions that coincide almost everywhere; we can alter an equilibrium bid function on measure zero of quantities without affecting equilibrium outcomes.
8 The uniform-price auction, the other frequently used auction format, can admit multiple equilibria, some of which generate very little revenue. See LiCalzi and Pavan [2005] , McAdams [2007] , Kremer and Nyborg [2004] , and the discussion of uniform-price below. There is no contradiction here with our revenue equivalence presented below: we prove revenue equivalence between the unique equilibrium in pay-as-bid and the seller-optimal equilibrium in uniform-price; the seller can ensure that the latter equilibrium is unique by judiciously selecting the reserve price.
9 Maximum likelihood-based estimation strategies (e.g. Donald and Paarsch [1992] ) also rely on agents playing comparable equilibria across auctions in the data. Chapman et al. [2005] discuss the requirement of comparability of data across auctions.
10 See also, in a related context, Cantillon and Pesendorfer [2006] ferentiable in quantities. We prove symmetry, strict monotonicity, and differentiability rather than assuming them: in our analysis we allow all Bayesian-Nash equilibria, including asymmetric ones, and we impose no strict-monotonicity or regularity assumptions on the submitted bids.
The bid representation theorem has other immediate implications. With the distribution of supply concentrated around a target quantity, our representation implies that bids are nearly flat for units lower than the target, and that the bidder's margin on units near the target is low. The representation theorem also implies that the seller's revenue increases when bidders' values increase, or when more bidders arrive. Finally, the bid representation theorem also plays a central role in our analysis of auction design and revenue equivalence between pay-as-bid and uniform-price auctions.
Building on our theory of equilibrium bidding, we address outstanding questions surrounding the design of divisible-good auctions. Traditionally a key instrument in auction design is the reserve price; for divisible goods there is a second natural instrument: the supply distribution. Our first result on design establishes that every reserve price decision can be replicated by an appropriate supply restriction, so that the two choices lead to identical bidding behavior in the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the pay-as-bid auction. Thus supply adjustments can accomplish everything reserve prices can, but-as we also show-the reverse is not true. 11 Second, we address the question of which distributions of supply are optimal in pay-as-bid. Our main result here says that the revenue in the pure-strategy equilibrium is maximized when the supply is deterministic; computing the level of the optimal deterministic supply is equivalent to a standard monopoly problem. In practice, in many of these auctions the distribution of supply is partially determined by the demand from non-competitive bidders, and revenue maximization is not the only objective of the sellers. However, treasuries and central banks have the ability to influence the supply distributions, as well as to release data on non-competitive bids to competitive bidders; in this context our result provides a revenue-maximizing benchmark.
While the result that deterministic selling strategies are optimal is familiar from the no-haggling theorem of Riley and Zeckhauser [1983] , in multi-object settings the reverse has been shown (Thanassoulis [2004] , Pycia [2006] , Vincent [2006, 2007] ).
Furthermore, there is a subtlety specific to pay-as-bid that might suggest the role for 11 In this regard pay-as-bid is different from uniform-price; as we discuss below in uniform-price auctions reserve prices play an important role. randomization: by randomizing supply below the monopoly quantity, the seller forces bidders to bid more on initial units, and in pay-as-bid the seller collects the raised bids even when the realized supply is near monopoly quantity. We show that, despite these considerations, committing to deterministic supply is indeed optimal.
Finally, we compare the revenues in pay-as-bid and uniform-price auctions; uniformprice is the main alternative format for selling divisible goods. Our result on the optimality of deterministic supply allows us to easily show that with supply and reserve prices chosen optimally in both auction formats, the two formats are revenue-equivalent.
Setting the reserve price has no impact on the revenue in pay-as-bid, but is important in uniform-price. With supply and reserve price set optimally, the uniform-price auction has a unique equilibrium; were we to only set the supply optimally and ignore the reserve price, the uniform-price auction could have multiple equilibria and the revenue equivalence with the unique equilibrium of pay-as-bid would obtain only for the revenuemaximizing equilibrium of uniform-price.
Our divisible-good revenue equivalence result provides a benchmark for the longstanding debate whether pay-as-bid or uniform-price auctions raise higher expected revenues. This debate has attracted substantial attention in empirical structural IO, with Hortaçsu and McAdams [2010] finding no statistically relevant differences in revenues, Février et al. [2002] and Kang and Puller [2008] [2014] show that-with asymmetric bidders-either format can be revenue superior; with symmetric bidders pay-as-bid is revenue superior in all examples they consider. The supply distributions these papers consider are not revenue-maximizing, hence they obtain strict rankings where we obtain revenue equivalence. Swinkels [2001] showed that payas-bid and uniform price are revenue-equivalent in large markets; our equivalence result does not rely on the size of the market.
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12 Large market revenue equivalence was also obtained by Ausubel et al. [2014] .
Literature
There is a large literature on equilibrium existence in pay-as-bid auctions. The existence of pure-strategy equilibria has been demonstrated when the marginal values are linear and the distribution of supply is Pareto, see Wang and Zender (2002) , Federico and Rahman [2003] , and Ausubel et al. [2014] . Holmberg [2009] proved the existence of equilibrium when the distribution of supply has decreasing hazard rate and he recognized the possibility that the equilibrium does not need to exist.
13 Our sufficient condition for existence encompasses the prior conditions and is substantially milder; in fact, with sufficient number of bidders all distributions, including for instance the truncated normal distribution, satisfy our condition.
14 Equilibrium existence has also been proved in settings with private information. Kastl [2012] . Milgrom and Weber [1985] showed existence of mixed-strategy equilibria.
16 His assumption that bidders do not want to buy part of the supply represents a physical constraint in the reverse pay-as-bid electricity auction he studies: in his paper the bidders supply electricity and they face a capacity constraint-beyond a certain level they cannot produce more. This low-capacity assumption drives his analysis and it precludes directly applying it in the context of securities auctions in which the bidders are always willing to buy more provided the price is sufficiently low. et al. [2014] expanded the previous analysis to Pareto supply with bounded support and linear marginal values. Restricting attention to equilibria in which bids are linear functions of quantities, they showed the uniqueness of such linear equilibria. In contrast, we look at all Bayesian-Nash equilibria of our model, we impose no parametric assumptions and we do not require that some part of the supply is not wanted by any bidder.
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Our uniqueness result is also related to Klemperer and Meyer [1989] solved it under the assumption that the maximum supply strictly exceeds the maximum total quantity the bidders are willing to buy. 20 We do not rely on any of these assumptions, and our representation of bids as weighted averages of marginal values is new.
While we are not aware of prior literature on optimal design of supply and reserve 17 As a consequence of this generality, we need to develop a different methodological approach from that of the prior literature. McAdams [2002] and Ausubel et al. [2014] also established the uniqueness of equilibrium in their respective parametric examples with two bidders and two goods.
18 The analogue of their unbounded support assumption is our assumption that the support of supply extends all the way to no supply. While the two assumptions look analogous they have very different practical implications: a seller can guarantee that with some tiny probability the supply will be lower than the target; in fact, in practice the supply is often random and our support assumption is satisfied. On the other hand, it is substantially more difficult, and practically impossible, for the seller to guarantee the risk of arbitrarily-large supplies. Note also that we have known since Wilson [1979] that the uniformprice auction may admit multiple equilibria. No similar multiplicity constructions exist for pay-as-bid auctions.
19 Our uniqueness result is also related to papers on uniqueness of equilibria in single-unit auctions, particularly in first-price auctions; see, for instance, Maskin and Riley [2003] , Lizzeri and Persico [2000] , and Lebrun [2006] .
20 See footnote 16. We focus our discussion on settings with decreasing marginal utilities; for constant marginal utilities see Back and Zender [1993] and Ausubel et al. [2014] among others.
prices in pay as bid, a more general question was addressed by Maskin and Riley [1989] :
what is the revenue-maximizing mechanism to sell divisible goods? The optimal mechanism they constructed is complex and in practice the choice seems to be between the much simpler auction mechanisms: pay-as-bid and uniform-price.
21 Above, we discussed the literature on revenue comparisons between these two popular mechanisms.
Model
There are n 2 bidders, i 2 {1, ..., n}. Each bidder has a marginal valuation for quantity
We assume that v is strictly decreasing and Lipschitz continuous. The supply Q is drawn from a non-degenerate distribution F with density f and
We assume that f > 0 on the support and otherwise we impose no global assumptions on F . In particular, we allow distributions that are concentrated around some quantity and take values close to 0 with arbitrarily small probability. 23 We denote the inverse hazard rate by
In the pay-as-bid auction, each bidder submits a weakly decreasing bid function
Without loss of generality we may assume that the bid functions are right-continuous. The auctioneer then sets the market price p (also known as the stop-out price),
Agents are awarded a quantity associated with their demand at the stop-out price,
as long as there is no need to ration them. When necessary, we ration pro-rata on the margin, the standard tie-breaking in divisible good auctions. The details of the rationing 21 Some design issues were addressed in the context of uniform price auction: Kremer and Nyborg [2004] 22 For instance, Q might represent supply net of non-competitive bids as discussed in Back and Zender [1993] , Wang and Zender [2002] , and subsequent literature. Our uniqueness result does not rely on any additional assumptions, while our equilibrium existence theorem specifies a sufficient condition for the existence.
23 In some results, we also consider the limit as F puts all mass on a single quantity.
rule have no impact on our analysis of equilibrium bidding (Section 3). 24 The demand function (the mapping from p to q i ) is denoted by ' i (·). Agents pay their bid for each unit received, and utility is quasilinear in monetary transfers; hence,
We study Bayesian-Nash equilibria in pure strategies. The assumption that the bid functions are right-continuous is then without loss of generality. Indeed, take an equilibrium bid function of bidder i. The bid function is weakly decreasing, hence by changing it on measure zero of quantities we can assure it is right continuous. This change has no impact on bidder i's profit, or on the profits of any of the other bidders.
3 Main Results: Existence, Uniqueness, and The Bid
Representation Theorem
Let us start by introducing the central notion of weighting distributions. For any quantity
The auxiliary c.d.f.s F Q,n play a central role in our bid representation theorem (see below) and throughout our paper. Importantly, these distributions depend only the number of bidders and the distribution of supply, and not on any bidder's true demand. Note that as the number of bidders increases the weighting distributions put more weight on higher quantities.
We start by giving a sufficient condition for equilibrium existence.
Theorem 1. [Existence]
There exists a pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium if, for
Our sufficiency condition is generically tight: the weak-inequality analogue of our condition is necessary for the existence of pure-strategy equilibria. We provide the proof of Theorem 1 and subsequent results in the Appendix.
Consider some examples. Our sufficient condition is satisfied when marginal values, while the denominator is positive (since v is decreasing and the support of the weighting distribution is above Q for Q < Q). In the sequel we illustrate our other results with additional examples in which pure-strategy equilibria exists.
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While our sufficient condition shows that the equilibrium exists in many cases of interest, there are situations in which the equilibrium does not exist; see the discussion in our introduction.
Our next step is to establish that the equilibrium is unique.
Theorem 2.
[Uniqueness] The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is unique.
Two important comments on this and subsequent results are in order:
25 The existence of equilibrium in the linear/generalized Pareto example was established by Ausubel et al. [2014] . In Section 4.1 we extend our results to unbounded distributions, including the unbounded Pareto distributions studied by Wang and Zender [2002] , Federico and Rahman [2003] , and Holmberg [2009] ; our sufficient condition remains satisfied for unbounded Pareto distributions.
26 The sufficiency of decreasing hazard rate for equilibrium existence was established by Holmberg [2009] . 27 The first of these examples features a normal distribution, the second one-strictly concave marginal values, and the last one-reserve prices. In general, our existence condition is closed with respect to several changes of the environment: adding a bidder preserves existence, making the marginal values less concave (or more convex) preserves existence, and imposing a reserve price preserves existence.
• We state this and all our subsequent results presuming that the bidder's marginal utility v and the supply distribution F are such that the equilibrium exists.
• In this result and all subsequent results we restrict attention to bids at relevant quantities: that is, quantities that an agent has positive probability of winning.
Bids for the quantities that the bidder never wins have to be weakly decreasing and sufficiently competitive, but they are not determined uniquely.
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The existence and uniqueness results lead us to our main insight, the bid representation theorem:
Theorem 3. [Bid Representation Theorem] In the unique equilibrium, bids are given by
The resulting market price function is given by
Thus, the equilibrium price p is the appropriately-weighted average of bidders' marginal values v, and the same applies to equilibrium bid functions.
Consider three examples. Substitution into our bid representation shows that when marginal values v are linear and the supply distribution F is generalized Pareto,
⌘ ↵ for some ↵ > 0, the equilibrium bids are linear in quantity. This case of our general setting has been analyzed by Ausubel et al. [2014] . 29 Our bid representation remains valid when F puts all its mass on Q : taking the limit of continuous probability distributions which place increasingly more probability near Q, the representation 28 The reason a bidder's bids on never-won quantities need to be sufficiently competitive is to ensure that other bidders do not want decrease their bids on relevant quantities. In the setting with reserve prices, which we analyze in Section 5, the bids on never-won quantities do not need to be competitive and hence these bids are even less determined, but the equilibrium bids on the relevant quantities remain nevertheless uniquely determined.
29 Ausubel et al. [2014] calculated bid functions in terms of the parameters of their model (linear marginal values and Pareto distribution of supply) and do not rely on or recognize the separability property that is crucial to our analysis. While we focus on bounded distributions, Ausubel et al. [2014] look at both bounded and unbounded Pareto distributions, and Wang and Zender [2002] look at unbounded Pareto distributions. Our general approach remains valid for unbounded distributions, including Pareto, except that uniqueness requires a lower bound on admissible bids, e.g. an assumption that bids are nonnegative. We provide more details on this extension of our results in our discussion of reserve prices. 
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The above three theorems are proved in the Appendix. The rest of our paper builds upon them to establish qualitative properties of the unique equilibrium, and to provide guidance as to how to design divisible good auctions.
30 In all figures, we check the equilibrium existence condition and calculate the bids numerically using R-project. In Figure 1 we use the normal distribution with mean 3 and standard deviation 1, truncated on the interval [0, 6].
4 Application: Properties of the Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
Properties of the Unique Equilibrium
Let us start by recognizing some immediate corollaries of the bid representation theorem.
While we present these results as corollaries, parts of Corollaries 1 and 3 are among the key lemmas in the proofs of the main results of the previous section. In all such cases we provide in the appendix direct proofs of the relevant results.
Corollary 1. [Properties of Equilibrium]
The unique equilibrium is symmetric, and its bid functions are strictly decreasing and differentiable in quantities.
Recall that we impose no assumptions on symmetry of equilibrium bids, their strict monotonicity, nor continuity; we derive these properties.
Since the unique equilibrium is symmetric, there is an easy correspondence between the market price p (Q) given supply Q and the bid functions b
This relationship is embedded in the bid representation theorem.
Flat Bids, Low Margins, and Concentrated Distributions
A particular case of interest is when the distribution of supply is concentrated near some target quantity. We say that a distribution is -concentrated near quantity Q ⇤ if 1 of the mass of supply is within of quantity Q ⇤ .
Our bid representation theorem implies that the bids on initial quantities are nearly flat for concentrated distributions. Our representation theorem has also implications for bidders' margins. In the corollary below we refer to the supremum of quantities the bidder wins with positive probability as the highest quantity a bidder can win in equilibrium. Thus, each bidder's margin on the last unit they could win is zero; and, if the supply is concentrated around some quantity Q ⇤ , then the margin on units just below
close to zero.
Comparative Statics
Our bid representation theorem allows us to easily deduce how the bidding behavior changes when the environment changes. First, as one could expect, an increase in marginal values always benefits the seller: higher values imply higher revenue. 31 This is illustrated in Figure 3 in which increasing the number of bidders from 5 bidders to 10 bidders has only a small impact on the bids, as does the further increase from 10 bidders to 5 million bidders. To see analytically what happens for large numbers of bidders, let us denote the distribution of per-capita supply byF , and note that
, and the limit bids take the form
In particular, in large markets, the bid for any unit is given by the average marginal value of higher units, where the average is taken with respect to (scaled) per-capita supply distribution.
31 Notice that if we keep the supply distribution fixed while more and more bidders participate in the auction, then in the large market limit the revenue converges to average supply times the value on the initial unit. See Swinkels [2001] . The reserve price and the distribution of supply are two natural elements of pay-as-bid auction that the seller can select. 32 We now leverage our bid representation theorem to analyze these design choices. In the process we relax the assumption that the distribution of supply is bounded.
Reserve Prices
Our further analysis of the reserve prices is based on the following:
Theorem 4. [Equilibrium with Reserve Prices]
In the pay-as-bid auction with reserve price R, the equilibrium is unique and it is identical to the unique equilibrium in the pay-as-bid auction with supply distribution F
Notice that distribution F R has a probability mass at supplyQ, which is the largest supply under this distribution. While we derived our results for atomless distributions, 32 In discussing the design problem we will maintain the assumption that the pay-as-bid format is run. The optimal mechanism design for selling divisible goods has been analyzed by Maskin and Riley [1989] ; the optimal mechanism is complex and it is not used in practice. In addition to setting supply and reserve prices, the choice in practice is between pay-as-bid and uniform price auctions. We address the latter question in the next section.
our arguments would not change if we allowed an atom at the highest supply. Thus, all our equilibrium results remain applicable.
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The rest of the proof of Theorem 4 is then simple. When the distribution of supply is F R then the last relevant bid is exactly R by Corollary 3, and hence imposing the reserve price of R does not change bidders' behavior. Furthermore the equilibrium bids against F R remain equilibrium bids against F with reserve price R, and one direction of the theorem is proven. Consider now equilibrium bids in an auction with reserve price R. 34 The sum of bidders' demands is then always weakly lower than nv 1 (R) and hence their bids constitute an equilibrium when the supply is distributed according to F R . This establishes the other direction of Theorem 4.
An immediate corollary from the equivalence between reserve prices and a particular change in supply distribution is:
Corollary 6. [Reserve Price as Supply Restriction] For every reserve price R there is a reduction of supply that is revenue equivalent to imposing R.
While reserve prices can be mimicked by supply decisions, not all supply decisions can be mimicked by the choice of reserve prices. In particular, the revenue with optimal supply is typically higher than the revenue with optimal reserve price. Notice also that, with concentrated distributions, our results imply that attracting an additional bidder is more profitable then setting the reserve price right.
Our analysis of optimum supply in the next subsection further implies that:
Corollary 7. [Optimal Reserve Price] The optimal reserve price R is equal to bidders' marginal value at the optimal deterministic supply:
When the reserve price R is binding, the equivalence between reserve price and supply restriction gives an implicit "maximum supply" of Q R = nv 1 (R). At this quantity, parceled over each agent, each agent's bid will equal her marginal value, as at Q in the unrestricted case. Since bids fall below values, this bid is weakly above the bid placed at this quantity when there is no reserve price. For quantities below Q R the c.d.f. is 33 We provide more details in the Appendix. Importantly, if marginal values v and a distribution of supply F satisfy our sufficient condition for equilibrium existence, then F R satisfies this condition as well. Indeed, for Q <Q, folding the tail of the distribution F into an atom in F R leaves the left-hand side of this condition unchanged while making the right-hand side more negative (since its numerator is negative and the mass shift makes the positive denominator smaller).
34 Instead of this step of the argument, we could check directly that our uniqueness result, Theorem 4, remains true in the setting with reserve prices. The equilibrium bid function with normal distribution of supply (left), with optimal reserve price (right). The bid for the implicit "maximum quantity" equals the marginal value for this quantity, and the entire bid function shifts up.
unchanged, hence our representation and uniqueness theorems combine to imply that the bids submitted with a reserve price will be higher than without. These effects can be seen in Figure 4 .
To conclude the discussion of reserve prices let us notice that we developed this theory of equilibrium bidding assuming that the distribution of supply is bounded. However, in the presence of a reserve price, any unbounded distribution is effectively bounded, hence we can relax the boundedness assumption.
Optimal Supply
Consider first the problem of the seller who has some quantity Q of the good, and would like to design a supply distribution F that maximizes her revenue. For deterministic quantities the problem is simple: offering quantityQ  Q leads to a unique equilibrium in which all bids are flat. , with a direct and negative revenue impact, but when he sells quantity Q ? he will receive higher payments due to the pay-as-bid nature of the auction.
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We answer this question, and show that selling the deterministic supply Q ? is in fact revenue-maximizing for sellers across all pure-strategy equilibria; for this reason in the sequel we refer to Q ⇤ as optimal supply.
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Theorem 5. [Optimal Supply] In pure-strategy equilibria, the seller's revenue under non-deterministic supply is strictly lower than her revenue under optimal deterministic supply So far we have assumed that the seller has access to quantity Q and is free to design the distribution of supply. Our approach can be easily generalized: if the distribution of supply is exogenously given by F and is not directly controlled by the seller, the revenue maximizing-supply reduction by the seller reduces supply to Q ? whenever the exogenous supply is higher than Q ? , and otherwise leaves the supply unchanged.
Application: Divisible Goods Revenue Equivalence Theorem
In practice, sellers of divisible goods are not restricted to running a pay-as-bid auction:
the pay-as-bid auction and the uniform-price auction are the two most-commonly implemented multi-unit auctions. From a practical perspective, which of these two formats 36 A priori such trade-offs can go either way; see the introduction. The problem is well illustrated in Figure 2 , in which concentrating supply lowers the bids. 37 We restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria. A reason a seller may want to insure that purestrategy equilibrium is being played is that the symmetry of equilibrium strategies we proved implies that every pure-strategy equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions is efficient, while it is immediate to see that mixed-strategy equilibria are not efficient. Since pay-as-bid is largely employed by central banks and governments, the efficiency of allocations is an important concern. Note also that when considering stochastic supply, we maintain our global restriction to distributions of supply that have strictly positive density on some interval
is preferred is a highly important question, and has be extensively studied both in the theoretical and empirical literature on divisible good auctions (see the introduction).
The results of the previous section allow us to easily compare the revenues in the two auctions in the case of optimal supply and reserve price: in the uniform price auction the optimal supply is then also Q ? . In contrast to pay-as-bid, several equilibria are possible. Among them, the equilibrium in which all bidders bid flat at v
is revenue-maximizing and the seller can assure that this is the unique equilibrium of the uniform-price auction by setting the reserve price at v 1 n Q ? . The revenue from the fully-optimized uniform price auction is then exactly the same as in the pay-as-bid auction.
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Theorem 6. [Revenue Equivalence for Divisible Good Auctions] With optimal supply and reserve price, the revenue in the unique equilibrium of the pay-as-bid auction is exactly equal to the revenue in the unique equilibrium of the uniform-price auction.
While the seller's ability to set a reserve price has no impact on the revenue in payas-bid with optimal supply, it plays an important equilibrium-selection role in uniform price. As noticed above, without the ability to set reserve prices the two auction formats are revenue equivalent only with respect to the seller-optimal equilibrium of the uniformprice auction.
Corollary 8. [Pay-As-Bid Revenue Dominance] With optimal supply, the revenue in the unique equilibrium of the pay-as-bid auction equals the revenue in the revenuemaximizing equilibrium of the uniform price auction; in particular, the revenue in the pay-as-bid auction is always at least as high as the revenue in the uniform-price auction.
Theorem 6 suggests an answer to the why the debate over revenue superiority of the two canonical auction formats, pay-as-bid and uniform-price, remains unsettled. As captured by the extensive literature on pay-as-bid and uniform-price auctions, sellers are willing to expend significant energy determining which mechanism is preferable; it is reasonable to assume they are just as interested in the particulars of the mechanism they select. We have shown that if the parameters defining the mechanisms are optimally determined, they are revenue equivalent, hence relatively optimized auctions should have 38 The equivalence of Theorem 6 remains true if the seller is able to set different reserve prices for different units, as then the seller could fully extract bidders' surplus in both auction formats. similar revenues, independent of the mechanism employed.
39 And, indeed, this is what the empirical literature finds, see the discussion in introduction.
Conclusion
We have proved that Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is unique in pay-as-bid auction with uninformed bidders, provided a sufficient condition for equilibrium existence, and stated a surprisingly tractable bid representation. We hope that the tractability of our representation will stimulate future work on this important auction format.
Building on these results, we have discussed the design of pay-as-bid auctions. We have shown that in the pay-as-bid auction reserve prices can always be replicated by supply restrictions; this is a property that substantially differentiates pay-as-bid from uniform-price. We have also shown that optimal supply is deterministic.
Comparing pay-as-bid to uniform-price, we have established that the two auction formats are revenue-equivalent when supply and reserve prices are set optimally. When the seller has no ability to set the reserve price, pay-as-bid weakly dominates uniformprice.
Our results support the use of pay-as-bid format, and they may explain why payas-bid is indeed the most popular format for selling divisible goods such as treasury securities.
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A Auxiliary Lemmas
In this section we present the key lemmas and their proofs. Let us fix a pure-strategy candidate equilibrium. Recall that bid functions are weakly decreasing and we may assume that they are right-continuous. Given equilibrium bids the market price (that is, the stop-out price) p (Q) is a function of realized supply Q. Our statements are about relevant quantities, that is for each bidder we ignore quantities larger than the maximum quantity this bidder can obtain in equilibrium (for instance in lemma below, all bidders could bid flat for units they never obtain). 
Proof. We must first establish that agent i is never subject to "mutual ties." Suppose that there are q ì < q i r and some agent j 6 = i with q j < q j r such that, for all
; without loss, we may assume that agent i is such thatq i < q 
The agent wins quantities from this range with positive probability, and hence the agent could profitably deviate tô
Such a deviation never affects how she might be rationed, by the first part of this proof; hence it is necessarily utility-improving. (q + ")} , the utility loss from loosing the relevant quantities is at most of the order "
Notice that the probability difference here goes to zero as " goes to zero (even if there is a probability mass at q). At the same time the cost savings from paying lower bids at quantities higher than q + " is of the order " 2 . Hence, this deviation would be profitable.
Lemma 2. For no price level p are there are two or more bidders who, in equilibrium, bid p flat on some non-trivial intervals of quantities.
Proof. The proof resembles similar proofs in other auction contexts; we have already established a smaller version of this result in the proof of Lemma 1. Suppose agent i bids p on (q`, q r ) and bidder j bids p on (q 0 , q 0 r ). Since the support of supply is
) and similarly for bidder j. Now, Lemma 1 implies that by lowering q r if needed we can assume that v i (q r ) < p and q r < ' i p Q . But then bidder i would gain by raising his bid on (q`, q r ) by a small " (and if needed by raising the bids on lower units as little as necessary for his bid function to be weakly decreasing).
Indeed, the cost of this raise would be go to zero as " & 0 while the quantity of the good the bidder would gain and the per-unit utility gain would be both bounded away from zero.
Lemma 3. The market price p (Q) is strictly decreasing in supply Q.
Proof. Since bids are weakly decreasing in quantity, the market price is weakly decreasing as a direct consequence of the market-clearing equation. If price is not weakly decreasing in quantity at some Q, then a small increase in Q will not only increase the price, but will weakly decrease the quantity allocated to each agent. This implies that total demand is no greater than Q, contradicting market clearing.
Lemma 2 is sufficient to imply that the market price must be strictly decreasing: at every relevant price level at which at least two bidders compete, at least one of their submitted bid functions is strictly decreasing. Furthermore, at no relevant price levels we can have only one bidder, i, submitting a flat bid at price p: because at such a flat bidder i can have no positive incentive to reduce her entire flat, it must be that there is some other agent j whose bid function is right-continuous at price p. If p = 0, all opponents j 6 = i have a profitable deviation. 42 If p > 0, we appeal to Lemma 1. Given that i submits a flat bid and the bids of bidder j are strictly below his values for some non-trivial subset of quantities at which his bid is near p, bidder j can then profit by slightly raising his bid; this reasoning is similar to that given in the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. Bid functions are strictly decreasing.
Proof. We know that the price function is strictly decreasing in supply. Suppose bidder i bids flat at b in a non-trivial interval (q l , q r ) of the relevant range of quantities. First note that we cannot have b = b i ' i p Q as then the quantities in question are allocated with zero probability, and hence are irrelevant.
other bidder bids with positive probability in some interval [p ", p], then bidder i could profitably lower his bid on quantities (q l , q r ) (and possibly some other quantities above q r ). If there is another bidder who bids with positive probability in [p ", p] for every " > 0, then by Lemma 1 this bidder earns strictly positive margin on relevant units and she could profitably raise her bid just above p.
Let us denote
) is the probability that agent i receives at most quantity q when submitting bid b i in the equilibrium considered. The monotonicity of bid functions implies that as long as b i is an equilibrium bid, and given other equilibrium bids, the probability
We define the derivative of G i with respect to b as follows. For any q and b i , the
is weakly decreasing in t, and hence differentiable almost everywhere. With some abuse of notation, whenever it exists we denote the derivative of this mapping with respect to t by G Lemma 5. For each agent i and almost every q we have:
. From market clearing, this is
Where the demands ' j of agents j 6 = i are differentiable, we have
Since for all j, the demand function ' j must be differentiable almost everywhere, the result follows.
Lemma 6. At points where
) is well-defined, the first-order conditions for this model are given by
Equivalently, the first-order condition can be written as
where Q (p) is the inverse of p (Q).
Proof. The agent's maximization problem is given by
Integrating by parts, we have
In the first square bracket term, both multiplicands are bounded for q 2 
Calculus of variations gives us the necessary condition
This holds at almost all points at which G i b is well-defined. Rearrangement yields the first expression for the first-order condition.
To derive the second expression, let us substitute into the above formula for G i and G i b from the preceding lemma. We obtain
is well defined since we shown that p is strictly monotonic. By Lemma 4 the bids are strictly monotonic in quantities and hence q +
, and
, the second expression for the first order condition obtains.
Lemma 7. The market-clearing price for the maximum possible quantity, p(Q), is uniquely determined. The equilibrium quantities q i (Q) are also uniquely determined.
Proof. We tackle this in two steps: first, if bid functions have finite slope for individual agents' maximum quantities q i , then bids meet values at q i ; second, this must be the case. Although out of proper logical order, the former is easier to demonstrate than the latter.
First, suppose that in a particular equilibrium each agent's bid function has a finite slope at the maximum-obtainable quantity
). Without loss we can assume that b i is left-continuous at q i . We take the limit of the agent's first-order condition as q % q i , to allow for the fact that only needs to hold almost everywhere. Then we have 
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It is helpful here to state our proof approach. We first posit a deviation for agent i which "kinks out" her bid function, and renders it flat to the right of some q near q i . We then state an incentive compatibility condition which must be satisfied, since in equilibrium this deviation cannot yield a utility improvement. We notice that the ratio of additional bid to profit margin can be made arbitrarily small over the relevant regions of this new flat. Fixing a small deviation, we pick the agent who has the least probability of obtaining quantities affected by the deviation, and then find even small deviations for all other agents such that, ceteris paribus, they have an equal probability of their outcome being affected. Since these deviations cannot be profitable in equilibrium, we obtain an inequality which must be satisfied by the sum of all agents' incentives. We then find that, for sufficiently small deviations, this inequality cannot be satisfied, implying that for some agent a small deviation must be profitable. It follows that it cannot be the case that all agents have bids below values.
In this case, for a given agent i and > 0, consider a deviationb
For small , this deviation will give the agent the full marginal market quantity for all
(q; ) be the quantity obtained under the deviation when, under the original strategy, the quantity would have
⌘ .
We will use this quantity to analyze the additional quantity the deviation yields above
Incentive compatibility requires that this deviation cannot be profitable, hence the additional costs must outweigh the additional benefits,
Because in the latter expression the inner integrands are constant, we can express this in terms of our
Since we have assumed that v
With a finite number of agents, for any  > 0 there is a such that for all 0 < the above inequality is satisfied. Picking such a , let agent i be such that
and for each agent j letˆ j  be defined by
Let Q = Q P jˆ j , and note that
The above incentive compatibility argument must hold for each agent, hence summing over all agents, we
Writing this in terms of conditional expectations, this is
, and it must be that
Dividing through, we have ( + 1)/n > 1, and this inequality does not depend on ;
since  > 0 may be arbitrarily small, this is a contradiction. Thus we cannot have
) for all agents i. Having already established that when at least one agent i has v 
Since v i is strictly decreasing in q, there is a unique solution to this equation. From
, it follows that quantities are also unique.
Lemma 8. Every equilibrium is symmetric.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium, possibly asymmetric. Let p(Q) be its market price function. By Lemma 3 this function is strictly decreasing, and hence it has an inverse, denoted Q(p), which is differentiable almost everywhere.
Let ' i be bidder i's demand function. Our assumptions and Lemmas 4, 6, and 7
imply that this function is weakly-decreasing, continuous, 45 and that it almost everywhere
Since these five conditions are identical for all bidders, in order to show that the equilibrium is symmetric it is enough to prove that these five conditions uniquely determine bidder i's demand function.
For an indirect argument, suppose that' i is another function satisfying the above five conditions. Then there is p 0 > p(Q) such that '
, and by the continuity of ' i the same is true on some small interval around p 0 ; in particular we can assume that
; the proof in the other case follows the same steps. The monotonicity of v gives v('
), hence the above-displayed equation, the strict positivity of the right-hand side, and the strict positivity of the second factor on the left-hand side together imply that '
This contradicts ' i and' i taking the same value at p(Q) < p 0 , and concludes the proof. 45 The demand function ' i is continuous because the bid functions are strictly decreasing.
B Proof of Theorem 2 (Uniqueness)
Proof. From Lemma 6 and market clearing, we know that for all bidders
Since Lemma 8 tells us that agents' strategies are symmetric, Lemma 5 allows us to write this as
From market clearing, we know that
where. Thus we have
Now suppose that there are two solutions, p andp. From Lemma 7 we know that p(Q) = p(Q). Suppose that there is a Q such thatp(Q) > p(Q); taking Q near the supremum of Q for which this strict inequality obtains we conclude thatp Q (Q) < p Q (Q).
46 But then we havê
The right-continuity of bids, and hence of p, allows us to conclude that if p solves the first-order conditions,p cannot.
C Proof of Theorem 3 (Bid Representation)
From the first order condition established in the proof of uniqueness, the equilibrium price satisfies
The inequality inversion here from usual derivative-based approaches reflects the fact that we are "working backward" from Q, while any solution must be weakly decreasing: thus a small reduction in Q should yieldp(Q) = p(Q)  p <p.
Substituting and canceling, we have for Q < Q:
Since 1 F (Q) = 0, this implies that
The market price is then given by
(1 F (Q)) ⇢ , our formula for market price obtains, and since we have proven earlier that the equilibrium bids are symmetric, the formula for bids obtains as well. This concludes the proof.
D Proof of Theorem 1 (Existence)
While we presented Theorem 1 (existence) first, its proof builds on our Theorems 2 and 3. Of course, the proofs of the latter two theorems do not depend on Theorem 1.
Proof. We want to prove that the candidate equilibrium constructed in Theorem 3 is in fact an equilibrium. Let us this fix a bidder i whose incentives we will analyze, and assume that other bidders follow the strategies of Theorem 3 when bidding on quantities q  Q/n and that they bid v(Q/n) for quantities they never win. 47 Since bids and values are weakly decreasing, in equilibrium there is no incentive for bidder i to obtain any 47 When proving the analogue of Theorem 1 in the context of reserve prices, we need to adjust this expression to deal with reserve prices: in the analogue, Q becomes nv 1 (R). The remainder of the argument does not change. quantity q > Q/n and we only need to check that bidder i finds it optimal to submit bids prescribed by Theorem 3 for quantities q < Q/n. Thus, agent i maximizes
We need to show that the maximizing function b (·) is given by Theorem 3, and because the bid function in Theorem 3 is strictly monotonic, we can ignore the monotonicity constraint. The problem can then be analyzed by pointwise maximization: for each quantity q 2 h 0,
Therefore, we can rely on one-dimensional optimization strategies to assert the sufficiency conditions for a maximum. The agent's first-order condition is
This first order condition on b yields pointwise the bidding strategy of Theorem 3 and it remains to verify that the sufficient condition of Theorem 1 implies that the sufficient second-order condition for a maximum,
is satisfied for any q when bidder i submits the bid of Theorem 3 as do all other bidders.
As an aside to justify the remark following Theorem 1, let us notice that the calculus of variations implies that the weak-inequality counterpart of this sufficient condition is a necessary condition for a bidder to achieve maximum while bidding b, and hence for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
To complete the proof we show that the algebraic expression of our sufficient condition in Theorem 1 is equivalent to the sufficient condition derived above. We use the following equalities (see Lemma 6): DenotingH (q) = 1 F (nq) (n 1)f (nq)
, we express the agent's first order condition as
Differentiation gives
The second-order condition is imposed at points satisfying the first-order condition; thus substituting in for b q and b, we equivalently re-express the second-order condition as 
E Proofs for examples
Derivative of the log of the inverse hazard rate, generalized Pareto distributions. For a generic distribution, the derivative of the log of the inverse hazard rate is For Q < Q, the right multiplicand is strictly positive. With large n this expression becomes arbitrarily negative (as discussed in the main text, the effect on dF Q,n (x) points in the same direction). Then for large n there our sufficient condition will be satisfied, independent of the underlying distribution.
Linear marginal values with generalized Pareto distribution of supply imply linear bids. Recall our bid representation theorem,
We integrate by parts to find Integrating, the bid function is b (q) = 0↵ (n 1) + n Q nq .
Bids are therefore linear in q.
F Modifying the Proofs to Allow for Reserve Prices
In Section 5 we study reserve prices, and we show that imposing a binding reserve price is equivalent to creating an atom at the quantity at which marginal value equals to the reserve price. In order to extend our results to the setting with reserve prices, we thus need to extend them to distributions in which there might be an atom at the upper bound of support Q. All our results remain true, and the proofs go through without much change except for the end of the proof of Theorem 3, where more care is needed.
The proof of Theorem 3 goes through until the claim that 1 F (Q) = 0; in the presence of an atom at Q this claim is no longer valid. We thus proceed as follows. We multiply both sides of equation (2) Recall from Lemma 7 that p(Q) = v(Q/n). Extending our notation to the auxiliary distribution F Q,n , we also have (1 F (Q)) ⇢ for all Q, y < Q, we have
proving our formula for equilibrium stop-out price.
G Proof of Theorem 5 (Optimal Supply)
We begin by setting up the seller's revenue-maximization problem. Conditional on the distribution of supply, the seller's expected revenue is
Integrating by parts, this is
Notice that the left-hand term is 0. Hence
This solution is intuitive: the seller obtains payment p(Q) with exactly the probability that the supply is at least Q.
Substituting in for p as defined in the main text,
Letting J(Q) = (1 F (Q)) (n 1)/n , the seller's problem is
Lemma 9. Let Q ? be the monopoly quantity, and let F be some quantity distribution function. Then the revenue generated by any continuous distribution function F is weakly dominated by the revenue generated by setting the monopoly price.
Proof. We rewrite our expected revenue form as
We know that J(Q)  1 everywhere, and 1/(n 1)  1 as well. It follows that
